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Abstract 
 
After more than eight years of implementing transition reforms, the economic environment in Serbia, 
while showing signs of progress, remains unsatisfactory. The economy of Serbia is facing too many 
difficulties, which are reinforced by the “spillovers” from the global financial crisis. Nevertheless, the 
country’s economy could rebound in the coming period if certain conditions are met. 
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1. Introduction 
After more than eight years since the transition process started, the economic environment in Serbia, 
while showing signs of progress, cannot be deemed satisfactory. The Serbian economy is facing 
numerous problems, which are aggravated by the “spillovers” from the global financial crisis. 
 
An attempt to answer, at least partially, some of the questions relating to the course of the transition in 
Serbia will be made in this paper. The effects of the transition reforms implemented to date in Serbia 
and the prospects for ensuring an enabling business environment under unfavourable conditions 
created by the global financial crisis will be assessed. 
2. The transition process and the business environment in Serbia 
2.1. Analysis of the transition indicators for Serbia 
While the transition process has yielded results, many desired objectives have not been reached. 
Regrettably, many initial expectations that transition reforms, in particular the privatisation and 
restructuring of enterprises, would enable a radical improvement of key economic performances have 
not been met. The belief that reforms would boost economic development is increasingly giving way, 
as transition losses build up, to a slowdown in reforms and even scepticism that they will create any 
improvements in the near future. 
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According to the criteria that the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development uses in its 
assessment of transition results [2], Serbia was ranked 12th-17th among nineteen transition economies 
in Europe in 2008. All countries of the Visegrád Group, the Baltic countries, Eastern Balkan countries 
and some countries in the Western Balkans (Croatia, Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia) had a higher ranking than Serbia. 
 
In 2008, Serbia achieved the best results in price liberalisation, then in small-scale privatisation and in 
trade and foreign exchange liberalisation and, finally, in banking reform and interest rate liberalisation. 
The least amount of progress was observed in the implementation of a competition policy and in the 
development of securities markets and financial institutions other than banks. Serbia was relatively 
slow in long-term structural reforms. The country’s average score was 2.89 on a scale of 1 to 4+. 
Table 1 outlines the results that Serbia achieved in the areas of key importance for the transition 
process. 
 
Table 1. Transition indicators for Serbia, 2001-2008 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Large-scale privatization 1.00 2.00 2.33 2.33 2.67 2.67 2.67 2.67
Small-scale privatization 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.33 3.33 3.67 3.67 3.67
Enterprises restructuring 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.33 2.33 2.33 2.33
Price liberalization 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
Trade and foreign exchange liberalization 2.67 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.33 3.33 3.33 3.67
Competition policy 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.67 2.00 2.00
Banking reform and interest rate liberalization 1.00 2.33 2.33 2.33 2.67 2.67 2.67 3.00
Securities markets and non-bank financial institutions 1.00 1.67 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Infrastructure reform 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.33
Average score 1.52 2.33 2.41 2.44 2.59 2.70 2.74 2.89
 Source: [2] 
 
The analysis of the pace of transition in Serbia reveals a rather pronounced cyclical tendency. Clear 
progress in 2002 was followed by a hiatus in 2003 and particularly in 2004, after which the economy 
recovered to some extent in 2005 and 2006. Then came another pause (in 2007) and another 
improvement (in 2008). 
 
Figure 1. Position of Serbia among countries in transition, 2008 
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   Source: [2] 
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In conclusion, the pace of transition reforms in Serbia has been rather slow, in a “stop-and-go” fashion. 
However, the achieved results can be seen as relatively satisfactory (see Figure 1), especially given the 
huge delay (ten years) in the implementation of reforms in comparison with many countries in Central 
and Eastern Europe. 
2.2. Comparative analysis of the business environment in Serbia and in Central  
        and Eastern European countries 
The business environment in Serbia that emerged as a result of transition reforms is neither too 
favourable nor too competitive compared with Central and Eastern European countries. The most 
recent World Bank report on business conditions [9], in which ten ease-of-doing-business indicators 
are analysed, shows that Serbia ranks low in this respect – Serbia is positioned as 94th among 181 
countries. 
 
In terms of the ease of doing business, Serbia lags behind other countries in transition. Serbia ranks 
below Slovakia (36), Hungary (41), Slovenia (54), the FYR of Macedonia (71), the Czech Republic 
(75), Poland (76) and even Montenegro (90). It is interesting that Serbia ranks higher than Croatia, 
even though Croatia is far more advanced in negotiations on accession to the European Union. The 
rankings of selected countries by specific indicators are given in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Selected rankings on the ease of doing business, 2009 
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Starting a business 106 12 105 161 117 41 27 48 86 145
Dealing with construction permits 171 152 167 137 163 69 89 53 86 158
Employing workers 91 125 104 117 146 158 84 83 59 82
Registering property 97 88 123 144 109 104 57 7 65 84
Getting credit 28 43 43 59 68 84 28 12 43 28
Protecting investors 70 88 24 88 126 18 113 104 88 38
Paying taxes 126 27 139 154 33 78 111 126 118 142
Trading across borders 62 64 125 55 97 78 68 116 49 41
Enforcing contracts 96 70 130 123 44 79 12 47 95 68
Closing a business 99 129 42 60 79 38 55 37 113 82
Ease of doing business 94 71 90 119 106 54 41 36 75 76
 Source: [9] 
  
The currently unfavourable ranking of Serbia on the ease of doing business results from the following 
factors: 
- Numerous and time-consuming procedures still stand in the way of starting a business in Serbia. It 
takes 11 procedures and 23 days to start up an enterprise. Serbia’s ranking in this respect is lower than 
in the previous period, notwithstanding frequent (apparently only declarative) endeavours to improve 
start-up conditions, especially for small and medium-sized enterprises. 
- In dealing with construction permits, an enterprise in Serbia faces 20 procedures that take 279 days. 
In this regard, Serbia is significantly below the average for Central and Eastern European countries. 
- The rigidity of labour regulations is decisive for a country’s ranking in the field of employment, 
because it has effects on the level of unemployment and the size of the informal sector. However, 
labour regulations are more rigid in Serbia than in any country of the Visegrád Group. 
Chapter 16. The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Transition Changes in Serbia 
 
141
- Registering property in Serbia requires 6 procedures and takes 111 days. There have been no 
changes in this respect in the last three years. 
- Of all indicators analysed by World Bank experts, Serbia ranks highest on conditions for obtaining 
credit. 
- In protecting investors, Serbia ranks satisfactorily (70), higher than a number of its neighbours: the 
FYR of Macedonia (88), Bosnia and Herzegovina (88) and especially Croatia (126). 
- Serbia has a complex and insufficiently transparent tax system. The number of annual tax payments 
amounts to 66, meaning that an enterprise spends as many as 279 hours to fulfil its tax obligations. 
- Judging by the time needed to export or import, trading across borders is easier in Serbia than in 
any other country included in Table 2. However, the costs to export are higher only in Montenegro and 
Slovakia, whereas the costs to import are higher only in Montenegro. 
- The efficiency of the Serbian legal system is unsatisfactory. To collect disputed receivables 
resulting from commercial agreements, an enterprise spends 635 days on 36 procedures, while the 
average rate of debt collection from insolvent enterprises is a mere 29%. 
- The closing of a business in Serbia still takes too much time and resources. The liquidation of an 
enterprise requires 2.7 years and 23% of bankrupt’s assets. 
 
A worrying fact is that World Bank analysts identified in the current report compared with the 
previous one some improvements in only one area in Serbia – in registering property. In the same 
period, the FYR of Macedonia implemented reforms in six areas, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria 
and Albania conducted reforms in four areas, whereas Croatia saw reforms in two areas. 
3. Key economic developments in Serbia, 2001–2008 
In early 2001, after the political changes of October 2000, Serbia embarked on the path of transition 
and, accordingly, of recovery and reintegration of its economy with the international community. 
Serbia became a member of all key international organisations (with the exception of the World Trade 
Organisation) and considerably improved its relations with the EU. However, Serbia remains the only 
country in the region for which the EU Stabilisation and Association Agreement has still not come into 
force. 
 
Table 3. Key economic indicators for Serbia, 2001–2008* 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Gross domestic product 
Real value, growth, % 5.6 3.9 2.4 8.3 5.6 5.2 6.9 5.5
Total, million € 12,820.9 16,033.7 17,416.4 19,075.0 20,358.0 23,520.6 29,542.7 34,260.0
Per capita, € 1,708.7 2,137.8 2,328.2 2,555.9 2,736.0 3,173.5 4,002.2 4,651.4
Gross value added by activities, % 
Industry 25.0 24.3 23.2 22.9 22.0 21.7 21.2 20.4
Agriculture 15.8 15.3 14.1 15.5 14.1 13.2 11.4 11.8
Construction 3.8 3.5 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.8 3.6
Services 55.4 56.9 58.8 57.9 60.3 61.5 63.6 64.2
Volume of production, growth, % 
Industry 0.1 1.8 -3.0 7.1 0.8 4.7 3.7 1.1
Agriculture 18.6 -3.4 -7.2 19.5 -5.0 -0.3 -8.0 8.5
Construction -5.8 12.7 3.2 9.8 5.8 10.9 18.9 4.9
Volume of services, growth, % 
Tourism -6.5 0.2 -7.3 -0.6 -2.2 1.4 11.2 0.1
Transportation 9.6 6.9 5.0 4.7 4.6 5.8 6.8 0.4
Communications 25.1 3.6 24.1 26.8 28.6 64.2 43.4 41.3
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  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Real value of services, growth, % 
Wholesale 0.8 12.2 3.2 24.3 17.0 13.3 16.7 10.3
Retail trade 19.8 23.9 13.8 18.0 26.5 7.7 23.0 5.9
Catering 1.1 0.9 0.1 1.3 -1.7 -7.4 6.0 1.0
Consumer prices (end-year), growth, % 
National classification 43.2 11.9 8.2 13.1 17.1 6.0 12.0 7.9
EU classification        11.0 8.6
Employment (annual average) and unemployment (end-year) 
Employed, thousand 2,101.7 2,066.7 2,041.4 2,050.9 2,069.0 2,025.6 2,002.3 1,999.5
Unemployment rate, % 13.4 14.5 16.0 19.5 21.8 21.6 18.8 14.7
Real value of wages and pensions (annual average), growth, % 
Average net wage 16.5 29.9 13.6 10.1 6.4 11.4 19.5 3.9
Average pension 17.9 16.8 9.7 5.9 4.2 2.9 4.7 14.3
Merchandise trade and foreign direct investments, million € 
Exports 1,922.2 2,201.7 2,442.4 2,831.6 3,608.3 5,102.5 6,432.2 7,428.3
Imports 4,759.2 5,956.8 6,589.3 8,623.3 8,439.2 10,462.6 13,506.8 15,580.5
FDI, net 184.0 502.2 1,205.7 776.6 1,244.6 3,492.2 1,820.8 1,812.1
Foreign currency reserves of the central bank and external debt (end-year), million € 
Reserves 1,320.0 2,175.0 2,840.0 3,117.0 4,935.0 9,025.0 9,641.0 8,160.0
External debt 12,608.8 10,765.9 10,858.4 10,354.7 13,064.3 14,885.4 17,789.0 21,801.0
 * Real values imply constant prices; the rates of growth refer to the previous year. 
 Sources: [3, 4, 6] 
 
Between 2001 and 2008, Serbia recorded high economic growth: the gross domestic product grew at 
an average rate of 5.4% per annum. Furthermore, economic tendencies improved – as for the curbing 
of inflation, the growth of exports, increases in salaries and pensions, higher foreign exchange reserves 
and the inflow of foreign direct investments (see Table 3). The Serbian economy is, however, facing 
major problems and challenges. These include, in particular, a high trade deficit, a high unemployment 
rate and an excessively high public spending. 
 
The analysis of key economic indicators for Serbia in the period 2001–2008 points to the following 
conclusions: 
 
• In Serbia, as in Central and Eastern European countries, the growth of GDP was driven by the 
growth of the so-called tertiary sector (services), foreign trade, domestic demand and investments 
(mostly from foreign capital inflow). 
 
Unfortunately, the actual level of GDP in Serbia (34,260 million euros in 2008) is rather modest. Of 
all transition economies – according to the data released by the Statistical Office of the European 
Communities [5] – only Bulgaria, with a population size comparable to that of Serbia, has a similar 
level of GDP (34,118 million euros). Other transition economies have a much higher GDP. Romania, 
with three times the population of Serbia, has a four times higher GDP (137,035 million euros), while 
Hungary, with a population which is 36% higher than that of Serbia, has a three times higher GDP 
(105,843 million euros). Moreover, Croatia, with 40% less inhabitants, has a GDP that is about 40% 
higher (47,365 million euros), whereas Slovenia, which has a population 3.7 times smaller, generates a 
GDP about 10% higher (37,126 million euros). 
 
The structure of the Serbian economy is not much different from that of most EU member states. In 
the structure of the gross value added in Serbia in 2008, services accounted for 64.3%, while industry, 
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agriculture and construction accounted for 20.3%, 11.7% and 3.7%, respectively. A similar structure 
of the economy, although with a far lower share of agriculture, can be observed in most EU member 
states. However, the volume of Serbia’s real sector is modest, whereas the EU is a rich post-industrial 
society. 
 
• The growth of “traditional” sectors of the Serbian economy – agriculture and in particular 
industry – was, on average, much lower than the growth of GDP. Significant oscillations could be 
observed in industrial production from year to year (see Figure 2), but noticeable improvements did 
not take place. The Serbian industry is still characterised by obsolete technologies and a production 
that is largely based on labour-intensive and resource-intensive sub-sectors. 
 
Figure 2. Industrial production of Serbia, 2002–2008: Chain indices 
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     Source: [6] 
 
Transition reforms – primarily those relating to the privatisation and restructuring of enterprises – have 
been particularly intensive in industry, but they failed to radically increase the volume of production. 
Experiences from privatisation and restructuring vary greatly, ranging from failure to success. 
 
A large number of privatisations ended in a complete failure. The Privatisation Agency annulled 
privatisation agreements during the control process in many cases – but most enterprises the 
privatisation of which had been abolished fell in an even more precarious economic position, with slim 
chances to recover. 
 
Regrettably, the number of unsuccessful privatisations was even larger. Many of the new owners, 
often lacking the slightest of competences in the activities of the enterprises they purchased, were 
unable to improve the way of doing business. Some privatised enterprises underwent changes, usually 
operational ones, resulting primarily in labour force reduction. 
 
On the other hand, a certain number of privatised enterprises, in particular those acquired by “real” 
foreign investors, saw major improvements, reflected in a complete change of the business 
management, in accordance with international standards. 
 
• The volume of merchandise trade has increased considerably. In 2008, merchandise trade 
accounted for 23,008.8 million euros, which was 3.4 times higher than in 2001 (6,681.4 million euros). 
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Unfortunately, the growth of merchandise trade stemmed from the growth of imports that permanently 
and substantially exceeded the growth of exports. This, in turn, resulted in a persistent and increasing 
trade deficit (see Figure 3). The deficit generated in the last two years – especially in 2008, when it 
reached as much as 8,152.2 million euros – is not sustainable in the long term and, coupled with 
enormous public spending, constitutes a major potential source of large-scale macroeconomic 
instability. 
 
Figure 3. Merchandise trade of Serbia, 2001–2008: Values (billion €) 
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Source: [6] 
 
While exports have grown significantly, they remain low. The structure of exported goods is also 
unfavourable. Primary and resource-intensive products (products with little value added, mostly 
agricultural and mineral inputs) prevail in the structure of exports. A persistent constraint to the 
growth of exports is the lack of non-price factors of competition: design, brands, standards and the like. 
 
• The results achieved by Serbia in the field of employment leave much to be desired. The 
expected wave of new employment in the wake of the reform processes has so far failed. New 
employment has mostly been generated in sectors dealing with non-tradable goods, i.e. in sectors 
incapable of exporting. 
 
Developments in Serbia’s labour market in the transition process have been characterised by lower 
employment, which was due to privatisation and restructuring in the first place. The total number of 
the employed declined by 102.2 thousand between 2001 and 2008. 
 
In spite of a negative population growth, Serbia remains a country with high unemployment. In 
October 2008, the unemployment rate, based on the methodology of the International Labour 
Organisation, was 14.7% in Serbia – as opposed to 7.3% in the EU [5]. 
 
The issue of unemployment and new employment is one of the largest problems faced by Serbia – not 
only in an economic, but also in a social sense – and this will become even more severe as the 
economic crisis deepens. It should be pointed out that the growth of food prices is permanently higher 
in Serbia than in the EU in 2009 over 2008, and that the share of food in the total household 
expenditure accounts for 35.0% in Serbia – and only 14.5% in the EU [8]. 
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4. The impact of the global financial crisis on economic tendencies  
     and transition changes in Serbia 
• In late 2008, the global financial crisis started affecting the Serbian economy. The effects of the 
external crisis were felt in Serbia not only through the higher cost of money, but also through 
difficulties to export, owing to the recession in Serbia’s largest exports markets, primarily in EU 
member states. Moreover, foreign-owned banks slowed down their loan activities, taking a much more 
cautious approach in the new circumstances. 
 
Turbulences in international financial markets impaired the Belgrade Stock Exchange, as well. Late 
2008 saw a major decline in the volume of trade and the value of shares in the domestic securities 
market [1]. Total turnover was 882.5 million euros – 57.2% lower year-on-year. The index of the most 
liquid shares, Belex15, plummeted by 75.6%. Prices of shares included in the basket of BelexLine 
index suffered a somewhat smaller decline – 68.7%. Total market capitalisation was 10.3 billion euros 
– 36.4% lower than a year earlier. 
 
The effects of the global financial crisis became more obvious in the first quarter of 2009, when 
economic activity in Serbia saw a major decline [6]. Compared with the first quarter of 2008, imports 
fell by 25.7%, whereas exports fell by 23.8% (the percentages are calculated for amounts in euros). 
Construction activity (measured as the value of performed works at constant prices) was down by 17%. 
The decline in the volume of industrial production was almost identical – 16.9%. Retail trade turnover 
(at constant prices) decreased by 11.7%, while tourism turnover (measured as the number of overnight 
stays) decreased by 6%. In consequence, the GDP fell by 4.2% in real terms. Furthermore, illiquidity 
has reached huge proportions, and this may cause the bankruptcy of many enterprises, especially small 
ones. 
 
Budget revenues have shrunken, prompting a budget revision and steps to ensure new borrowing. In 
mid May 2009, the International Monetary Fund approved a facility of 2.9 billion euros to build up 
Serbia’s foreign exchange reserves. Shortly after that, large international banks agreed in Vienna to 
keep the overall level of loan exposure in Serbia. 
 
Measures have also been taken to reduce the risk for financial stability. Government guarantees for 
savings deposits have increased from 3,000 to 50,000 euros. In addition, incentives for savings and the 
stock exchange have been introduced. The government abolished the tax on foreign-exchange-savings 
interest, the tax on capital gains and the tax on the transfer of title to securities. This further reinforced 
the trust in the overall financial system and preserved the stability of the banking sector. It should be 
noted that the banking sector in Serbia is sounder than in most transition economies, because of strict 
regulation and control. 
 
However, in view of the current facts and most likely prospects, projections of key macroeconomic 
indicators, of which the projection of GDP is always in the limelight, have been revised. Thus, it has 
been officially estimated that the real GDP in 2009 would fall by 2% – and then by 4%. 
 
The current global financial crisis shook the foundations of the world and of the Serbian economy and 
will have serious repercussions on economic growth in the coming years. Forecasts of economic 
tendencies are continuously revised, even by such distinguished institutions as the World Bank. While 
it is very difficult to predict future economic developments, the following tendencies can be identified 
as highly probable: 
 
Firstly, economic developments in Serbia in the coming period will be under the dominant influence 
of the effects of the global financial crisis (which limits the potential for growth) and the resulting 
global economic environment. Besides, if the EU Stabilisation and Association Agreement does not 
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take effect, the economic situation in Serbia would further deteriorate, as the country would not be 
able to access certain EU funds and thus compensate for the reduction in foreign capital inflow. 
 
Secondly, the expected decline in exports-driven and domestic demand will result in an economic 
slowdown. Exports-driven demand is expected to decline because of the economic and trade 
slowdown worldwide, and particularly in EU countries, on which Serbia mostly depends for exports. 
On the other hand, domestic demand is expected to decline because of the projected restrictions in 
both public and private spending and because of lower capital investments that will result from limited 
access to borrowing abroad and limited inflow of foreign direct investments. 
 
• The negative effects of the global financial crisis have shifted the focus of macroeconomic 
policy from the monetary to the fiscal sphere, i.e. they have reaffirmed the role of the public sector and 
of budget management. Considerable effort will be required to cut soaring public spending. However, 
the role of the government should not be reduced to expenditure control and downsizing. The 
government needs to become more actively involved in the economic life, and not just by creating an 
economically enabling and legally reliable business environment. Its efforts should also be focused on 
providing incentives for agriculture development and for investments in infrastructure (particularly in 
Corridor 10), ad hoc involvement to salvage large enterprises from bankruptcy (especially exporters 
and those that employ many workers), providing incentives for exports, and also implementation of 
various non-tariff measures of protection (those permitted by the WTO). 
 
Monetary policy will remain focused on curbing inflation (at the level below 10%) and providing 
macroeconomic stability. Accordingly, a highly restrictive monetary policy can be expected to remain 
in place. However, certain adjustments to the new situation need to be made in this field. Interest rates 
in Serbia are still too high, much higher than in other countries in the region. Lowering interest rates 
(primarily the reference interest rate) could be a crucial step towards improving the competitiveness of 
Serbian enterprises in the global market and boosting economic growth. 
 
Adverse developments in international financial markets, compounded by the unfavourable 
investments risk rating given to Serbia, will have negative effects on domestic financial markets. It 
therefore seems reasonable to expect even an absence of portfolio investments, a reduction in the 
volume of financial market transactions, a lower share of foreign investors in the total stock exchange 
turnover, a slowdown of foreign loan inflows and lower foreign exchange reserves. 
 
Sales conditions in foreign and domestic markets will become worse in the coming period. The global 
financial crisis and lower global demand are expected to result in lower exports, especially of some 
leading sectors (e.g. the metal sector). The pressure of imports supply on the domestic market will 
increase. Coupled with the expected restrictive policy of commercial banks and insufficient 
competitiveness of the Serbian economy, this could lead to a production crisis and, possibly, to mass 
redundancies. In view of this, industrial production is expected to be about 15%-18% lower in 2009 
than in 2008. Furthermore, in 2009 both exports and imports are expected to decline by at least 25% 
compared with 2008. 
 
High unemployment will remain a key issue. In 2009, employment is expected to decline by 0.5% to 
1%. 
 
After nineteen years of privatisation according to various models and under different regulations, this 
process should finally be completed. Privatisation is not an end in itself. It is the key means of 
transition towards a market economy, i.e. it should enable efficient corporate governance and 
technological modernization of production, higher exports and improved overall efficiency and 
effectiveness of doing business. Regrettably, privatisation is often seen in Serbia as the sale of the 
“family silver” to foreigners [7]. It is frequently associated only with tycoons, illegal accumulation of 
wealth, theft, the acquisition of property at “preferential” prices, lay-offs and the like. While numerous 
Chapter 16. The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Transition Changes in Serbia 
 
147
anomalies have been registered during the privatisation process in Serbia, it appears that the 
privatisation process has nevertheless had positive effects on economic tendencies and on business 
efficiency. It is worth remembering that privatisation is only the first step on the long path of reforms 
that should ultimately improve the overall competitiveness. 
 
The transition reforms in Serbia have not produced the desired changes – improved business efficiency, 
economic recovery, renewal of economic potentials and new productive employment. The transition 
process turned out to be more complicated and longer than initially anticipated. Many circumstances 
were disregarded in the original analysis, including the issue of how transition economies would 
respond to cyclical tendencies, in particular recessions and crises. 
 
The current global financial crisis generates additional problems, which hinder the process of 
necessary transition reforms. Namely, in the new circumstances – characterised by recession, 
deepening of macroeconomic imbalances and sharpening of social tensions – other problems are 
taking centre stage, and this will not have positive effects on the implementation and pace of transition 
reforms. 
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